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GROUND LOST AND FOUND IN
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
ROGER J. TRAYNOR

system is that it elicits a reasonable
adversary
the
for
plea
T HE
approximation of the truth. The reasoning is that with each

side on its mettle to present its own case and to challenge its opponent's, the relevant unprivileged evidence in the main emerges
in the ensuing clash. Such reasoning is hardly realistic unless the
evidence is accessible in advance to the adversaries so that each
can prepare accordingly in the light of such evidence.
In civil litigation there is growing acceptance of the view
that each side can be required before trial not only to disclose
the evidence upon which it intends to rely, but also to respond
to searching inquiry by its adversary.1 In criminal litigation,
however, there is continuing resistance to pretrial discovery, the
more formidable because it has not only the force of law and habit
but also the force of adrenal reaction against seemingly plausible
menaces. The most cogent arguments for change encounter that
resistance. 2
Those who oppose pretrial discovery fear that it would give
an undue advantage to the defendant, since he would continue
himself to have substantial protection from discovery, notably the
privilege against self -incrimination. They fear also that the
defendant would misuse discovery to subvert the prosecution's
case by resorting to perjury and witness-tampering whenever it
Roger J. Traynor is Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of California.
This Article on American practice was prepared for an Anglo-American conference on criminal procedure held in London last July and sponsored by the
Institute of Judicial Administration. For an illuminating discussion of the conference, see Napley, The Criminal Trial: Anglo-American Procedure Compared,
60 L. Soc'y Gazette 582 (1963).
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 375-77, 364 P.2d 266, 275-76, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 98-99
(1961). See Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36
Minn. L. Rev. 633, 639 (1952).
2. See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or

Quest for
Truth?, 1963 Wash. L.Q. 279; Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1
Crim. L.Q. 3 (1962); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage
in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960); Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in
State Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1960); Kaufman, Criminal Discovery
and Inspection of Defendant's Own Statements in the Federal Courts, 57 Colum.
L. Rev. 1113 (1957); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?,
49 Calif. L. Rev. 56 (1961); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal
Procedure, 59 W. Va. L. Rev. 221, 239-41 (1957); Discovery in Federal Criminal
Cases, A Symposium at the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 33 F.R.D. 47 (1963).

CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

229

seemed expedient to do so in the light of what he had discovered.'
What they overlook is that the protection afforded the defendant
against discovery is in large measure counterbalanced by the
abundant resources for investigation available to the prosecution 4
and the corresponding opportunity it has to guard against perjury
and witness-tampering. In any event, one cannot predict such
dire misuse when there is such paucity of experience as to preclude
meaningful extrapolation.5

Moreover, there has been no uniformity in the development
of discovery, either before or at the trial, in common-law
jurisdictions that have experimented with it. There are no settled
norms regarding discovery by the defendant. As to reciprocal
discovery by the prosecution, there is as yet little more than an
occasional requirement that the defendant give advance notice of
specified defenses. What is significant is that in those jurisdictions
that have adopted discovery procedures, the trend is toward
expansion rather than restriction or abandonment.
However clear the general trend, the day-to-day course of
criminal discovery is still one of trial and error, perhaps inevitably
so in a land of great diversity and dimension. The states are free
to adopt their own rules of criminal procedure so long as those
rules comply with the minimum requirements of fairness imposed
upon the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 6 There is accordingly
great variation in the local development of pretrial discovery in
criminal cases. One can generalize, however, that many state
courts follow discovery procedures akin to those in the federal
courts, which are in the main restrictive. One can also generalize
that though the trend is toward liberalizing discovery, few states
have moved so far in this direction as California. 7 What these
3. United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); State v.
Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953); State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St.
397, 424-25, 91 N.E. 186, 192 (1910). See Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case Against
Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963). Compare Walsh, Fair Trials and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 49 A.B.A.J. 853, 854 (1963), opposing expanded discovery by the Government because of the possibility of witness tampering.
4. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1182-83.
5. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 290-91.
6. See text accompanying notes 78-81 infra.
7. In California, the appellate courts have played the major role in developing
criminal discovery; in other jurisdictions, the trial courts have usually taken the
initiative. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 297; Garber, supra note 2, at 10. Encouraged by appellate decisions that cautiously recognized their discretionary
power to grant discovery while approving its denial in the case at hand, see, e.g.,
State v. Cicenia, 6 N.J. 296, 300, 78 A.2d 568, 570-71 (1951); State vo Payne, 25
Wash. 2d 407, 411-12, 171 P.2d 227, 230 (1946), state trial courts have been increasingly willing to grant pretrial discovery in criminal cases. Although they have
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generalizations suggest, as a way to some perspective on a large
and changing panorama, is a comparison between restrictions on
discovery representative of federal procedure (and representative
still of procedure in many states) and the extensions of discovery
in California, a pilot state.
The federal courts allow discovery only in isolated cases,
and even then only when the moving party is able to particularize
a need or interest. No one seems quite certain about the particulars of particularization. There is no discernible rational pattern
in the needs and interests that are recognized as grounds for
discovery.8 One can imagine the baffling problems of particularizing a need or interest when the party has no access to the
evidence he seeks to discover. How does Tantalus particularize
that which is out of his sight as well as his reach? The homely
question put by John Marshall in the Aaron Burr Case answers
itself-"Now, if a paper be in possession of the opposite party,
what statement of its contents or applicability can be expected
from the person who claims its production, he not precisely knowing its contents?" 9 In the face of Chief Justice Marshall's
rhetorical question, the federal courts continue to bar the door
to discovery if there are no magic words of particularization to
open it. The door is even more severely barred against discovery
for the purpose of justifying discovery.10
Such wariness is not mandatory under the three sources of
authority governing discovery in federal criminal cases. Statutes
comprise one; of these, the most important is the Jencks Act,"
which prohibits pretrial discovery of statements given by witnesses
to government agents, but does authorize limited discovery of
such statements at the trial. A number of other matters are
been occasionally rebuffed even in recent years, Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135,
162-63, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (1952); Rosier v. People, 126 Colo. 82, 92-93, 247 P.2d
448, 453 (1952); State v. District Court, 135 Mont. 545, 549-50, 342 P.2d 1071,
1074-75 (1959); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953);
Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 86, 114 A.2d 334, 337-38 (1955), there is
much in the trend of recent decisions to encourage them to exercise their discretion
in favor of granting discovery. State ex rel. Mahoney v. Superior Court, 78 Ariz.
74, 275 P.2d 887 (1954); People v. Johnson, 356 Mich. 619, 97 N.W.2d 739 (1959);
State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 135-42, 145 A.2d 313,. 315-18 (1958); Layman v.
State, 355 P.2d 444 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); State ex rel. Sadler v. Lackey, 319
P.2d 610 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957); Petition of Di Joseph, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187
(1958) (concurring opinion); State v. Thompson, 54 Wash. 2d 100, 338 P.2d 319
(1959). See generally Fletcher, supra note 2; Garber, supra note 2.
8. Cf. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958).
9. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 191 (C.C. Va. 1807).
10. "It would indeed defeat . . . [the Jencks Act's] design to hold that the
defense may see statements in order to argue whether it should be allowed to see
them." Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
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governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme Court under congressional authorization;
the rules impose no martinet commands of particularization.
Finally, the federal courts themselves have declared, though all
too rarely exercised, their inherent power to grant discovery when
necessary to achieve justice. 12
At the pretrial stage in the federal courts, discovery operates
largely to the advantage of the prosecution. As Professor Goldstein has noted, the grand jury hearing can be used as "a fullfledged deposition procedure for the prosecution without the
embarrassing presence of defendant or his counsel."' 3 Even though
the prosecution does not ordinarily call a defense witness before
the grand jury, it can do so whenever discovery seems appropriate, as, for example, in antitrust cases. No comparable
discovery is available to the defendant, for depositions are limited
by Federal Rule 15(a) to cases where "it appears that a
prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from
attending a trial."
Only rarely can the defendant obtain a copy of the grand
jury testimony before the trial. Rule 6(e) permits disclosure of
grand jury minutes to government attorneys, but makes disclosure
to the defendant dependent upon the discretion of the court.' 4 The
Supreme Court has ruled that such discretion should be exercised
in favor of discovery only upon a showing of "particularized
need." 5 There has been recognition of only two such needs at
the pretrial stage. A majority of the cases permit disclosure of
the defendant's testimony to the grand jury when the charge is
12. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345 (1959) (dictum);
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (by implication); Shores v. United
States, 174 F.2d 838, 845 (8th Cir. 1949) (dictum); United States v. Duncan, 22
F.R.D. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (dictum); Kaufman, supra note 2, at 1121. For a
discussion of federal criminal discovery prior to the federal rules, see Orfield, supra
note 2, at 233-39.
13. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 1191.
14. Rule 6 (e) reads,
Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror
may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter or stenographer
may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed
by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding
or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a
showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The
court may direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant
is in custody or has given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the
indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons.
15. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959);
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958).
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that the defendant perjured himself by that testimony.16 Disclosure is also possible upon a motion to dismiss the indictment,
though only if the grounds for dismissal are specified and the facts
supporting them are set forth with particularity.17 Paradoxically,
the defendant can neither examine the grand jury minutes to
ascertain if there are grounds for dismissal1 8 nor take depositions
from witnesses or grand jurors for that purpose.19
The Supreme Court's principal justification for its rule
against discovery of grand jury testimony-that the effective
operation of the grand jury requires secret proceedings 2 ---is
belied by the experience of a number of states that permit defense
examination of grand jury transcripts.2 1 Professor Sherry rightly
16. United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-30 (3d Cir. 1954); United
States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.s.
907 (1952); United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120, 121 (D.N.J. 1952). Contra,
United States v. Owen, 11 F.R.D. 371 (W.D. Mo. 1951). See generally Note, 111
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154, 1179-80 (1963).
17. See, e.g., the following cases, all of which denied discovery: United
States v. Nasser, 301 F.2d 243, 245-46 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962);
United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v.

Lieberman,
F.R.D. 430
F.R.D. 343,
Indictments

15 F.R.D. 278, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. Aman, 13
(N.D. Ill. 1953). See generally Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22
449 (1959); Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Minutes To Challenge
and Impeach Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev.

1154, 1157-76 (1963).

18. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif.
L. Rev. 56, 69 n.50 (1961).

19. See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 822-23 (D. Conn.
1955) (refusing to permit defendant to examine grand jury foreman).
20. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959);
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). In United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra, at 681 n.6, the Supreme Court quoted
from United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954), in which the
court summarized the reasons for grand jury secrecy as follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those who indictment may be contemplated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and
to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning
the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with
the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later appear at the
trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to the commission
of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
The speciousness of these reasons, particularly when used, as in Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, supra, to prevent discovery at the trial for the purpose
of impeachment, has been pointed out by many writers. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. United States, supra, at 405-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 56, 69-71
(1961); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 Va.
L. Rev. 668, 674 (1962); Note, 11 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 323-34 (1959); 48 Calif. L.

Rev. 160 (1960).
21. See Sherry, supra note 20, at 679-84. At least three states supply the
defendant with a transcript of the grand jury proceedings. Cal. Pen. Code § 938.1;
Iowa Code § 772.4 (1962); Ky. Crim. Code § 110 (1958). Cf. Minn. Stat. § 628.04
(1961).
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concludes that "in the light of this experience, . . . the prevailing,

traditional policy of secrecy is an anachronism that has long outlived any real necessity.""
Apart from prosecution discovery by means of the grand
jury, there is little pretrial criminal discovery available in the
federal courts. There are no procedures analogous to the depositions and interrogatories, requests for admissions, or compulsory medical examinations authorized for civil cases by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendant can move for
a bill of particulars to the indictment under rule 7(f) "to enable
him to adequately prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at
the trial." 28 Granting of a bill of particulars, however, lies almost
entirely within the discretion of the trial judge,2 4 and bills are
seldom granted for the disclosure of evidentiary matters.2 5 In
capital cases the prosecution is required by statute to furnish the
defense with a list of the witnesses it will present at the trial,226
but it need not do so until three days before the trial; the
defense then has little time to locate and interview the
witnesses. The defendant in noncapital cases ordinarily cannot
obtain the names or addresses of prosecution witnesses.2 7 Pretrial
discovery of statements of witnesses to government investigators
is prohibited by the Jencks Act. 2 8 The federal courts bar discovery
even of the defendant's own statements, explicitly excluded from
the statutory prohibition, apparently for no better reason than
that no statute or rule specifically authorizes such discovery. 2 9
22. Sherry, supra note 20, at 684.
23. Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 310 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 889 (1961).
24. See, e.g., Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82 (1927); United
States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809
(1963).
25. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 282 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1960);
Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 650 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 923 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 207 F.2d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 938 (1954). But cf. United States v. Lipshitz, 150 F. Supp.
321 (E.D.N.Y. 1957) (fact that evidence will be disclosed not ground for denial of
bill of particulars). The bil of particulars has been a useful discovery device in
certain tax evasion prosecutions. See United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466, 476
(2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Eissner, 206 F. Supp. 103 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1958).
27. Dean v. United States, 265 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1959); United States
v. Hanlin, 29 F.R.D. 481, 486 (W.D. Mo. 1962). But see United States v. Solomon,
26 F.R.D. 397, 407 (S.D. Ill. 1960). If the defendant is an indigent who must subpoena his witnesses, rule 17(b) requires him to reveal their names and their expected testimony, thus giving the prosecution an effective avenue of discovery. See
Thomas v. United States, 168 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1948); Pye, The Defendant's Case
for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82, 84, 98 (1963).
28. 18 U.S.C. I 3500(a) (1958), quoted in note 50 infra.
29. See authorities cited in note 34 infra. The defendant has a limited opportunity to discover something about the case against him at the preliminary
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Federal Rules 16 and 17 provide for limited pretrial inspection and copying of documents and other tangible objects.
Rule 16, the only rule keyed to discovery, 0 is fettered with the
proviso that the items sought must have been obtained from or
have belonged to the defendant or have been obtained from others
by seizure or by process. 1 As this proviso makes clear, rule 16
was not designed to facilitate discovery of documents crucial to
the preparation of a defense. Its purposes are more mundane:
to protect the property right of the defendant in objects belonging
to him and to insure him continuing access to any documents that
the prosecution seizes from third persons through its subpoena
power. The courts have interpreted rule 16 accordingly. 8
Though a defendant may freely inspect a business document, he
may not see a purported confession in which he unfortunately
has no property right. He may inspect documents obtained from
third persons by seizure, but not documents obtained by threat of
seizure. 5 In matters of such importance, ritual is king as well
as the joker.
Rule 17(c),36 essentially a codification of the ancient power
examination where the prosecution must show that there is probable cause to hold
him. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c). No preliminary examination need be held, however,
if the defendant is prosecuted by information, United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d
472, 474 (9th Cir. 1953), or if he has already been indicted before arrest or before
the time set for the examination. See, e.g., Boone v. United States, 280 F.2d 911
(6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Universita, 192 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
United States v. Gray, 87 F. Supp. 436 (D.D.C. 1949).
30. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 218-21 (1951). See
also Orfield, supra note 2, at 330.
31. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 reads,
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment
or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the
defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense
and that the request is reasonable. The order shall specify the time, place
and manner of making the inspection and of taking the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
32. See United States v. Wortmen, 26 F.R.D. 183, 197 (E.D. II. 1960); Note
of the Advisory Committee to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; Kaufman, supra note 2, at
1114 n.7.
33. See generally Orfield, supra note 2, at 241-57, where the author summarizes all of the cases under Rule 16 from its adoption through 1957.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 820 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962); Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 842-45 (8th
Cir. 1949). See Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940, 1053
(1961). Cf. United States v. Kahaner, 203 F. Supp. 78, 85-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(statements in grand jury testimony). See also United States v. Fancher, 195 F.
Supp. 448, 451-58 (D. Conn. 1961), and cases cited therein.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Hanlin, 29 F.R.D. 481, 486 (W.D. Mo. 1962);
United States v. Brown, 179 F. Supp. 893, 896 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
36. Fred. R. Crim. P. 17(c) reads,
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to pro-
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of the federal courts to issue subpoenas duces tecum," has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as affording discretion to the
trial judge to grant pretrial discovery of items to facilitate "a
good-faith effort .

.

. to obtain evidence." 8 The lower federal

courts, however, generally bar discovery of an item unless it
would be directly admissible at the instance of the moving party;
hence, evidence admissible only at the instance of the party possessing it or admissible only to impeach a witness cannot be
discovered under rule 17(c)."

One familiar with the steady development of criminal discovery in his own state for nearly a decade may be permitted to
note that pretrial discovery in the federal courts appears by comparison not only inadequate, but riddled with arbitrary rules. A
proposed amendment to rule 16 would be a great step forward. It
would permit defense inspection of any documents or other real
evidence in the possession of the Government (except statements
of witnesses beyond the reach of discovery under the Jencks
Act), including both statements by the defendant and the results
of physical examinations and scientific tests. 4 0 The proposed
amendment, however, would not remedy other deficiencies.
duce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The
court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct that
books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time
when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production
permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions therof to be
inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
37. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif.
L. Rev. 56, 72 (1961); Note, The Scope of Criminal Discovery Against the
Government, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 492, 495 (1954).
38. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 821-22 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962). See also Kaufman, supra note 2, at 1116; Developments in the Law-Discovery, supra note 34, at 1054; Note, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 492,
496-98 (1954).
40. Amended rule 16 would read,
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment
or information, the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents or tangible objects, which are within the possession,
custody or control of the government, including written or recorded statements or confessions made by the defendant and the results or reports
of physical examinations and scientific tests, experiments and comparisons, upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and of taking
the copies or photographs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as
are just. This rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of statements or reports made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses (other than the defendant) to agents of the government
except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
United States District Courts (Preliminary Draft Dec. 1962).
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Federal discovery would continue to be a one-stage process. Only
if the defense fortuitously knows of items discoverable under
rule 16 or rule 17 can it invoke discovery; there is no procedure
enabling it to discover whether there are discoverable items.
Moreover, there is no procedure for discovering the names and
addresses of witnesses.4 1 The defense confronts many witnesses
for the first time in the contentious atmosphere of courtroom
cross-examination, when the witness has already allied himself
with the prosecution and may have rehearsed his testimony with
the prosecutor. It is not easy to elicit impartial testimony from a
witness under such circumstances. Moreover, 'the trial may run
its course without the defense's ever becoming aware of potential
witnesses not called by the prosecution.
The pretrial conference, on which the Federal Rules are as
yet silent,42 has occasionally been initiated by a federal judge,
usually to expedite the course of a complex criminal case.48 Some
discovery often ensues. Frequently, there are stipulations narrowing the issues to be tried, comparable to those that arise out
of requests for admissions in civil cases. Frequently, submission
of documents to opposing counsel at the pretrial conference
obviates dispute at the trial as to their authenticity. Frequently,
agreements made at the pretrial conference facilitate discovery at
the trial." Occasionally, the conference opens the way to inspection of otherwise undiscoverable documents.4 5
41. Proposed federal rule 12A would require a defendant, upon demand, to
file notice of intent to rely on an alibi defense. It lacks any requirement that
either side notify the other of the witnesses it will present on the issue of alibi, a
lack that the California Law Revision Commission suggests makes an alibi statute
"of little value." 3 Cal. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. J-20 (1961).
42. Proposed federal rule 17A is now under consideration:
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information the court
upon motion of either party or upon its own motion may order the
parties to appear before it for one or more conferences to consider such
matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. No admission of guilt
at the conference shall bind the defendant or be admissible in evidence.
This rule shall not be invoked in the case of a defendant who is not represented by counsel.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, supra note 40. A similar proposal was rejected when the Supreme
Court adopted the original Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1944. See 4
Barron, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 1803, at 10-12 (rules ed.
1951). See also Judge James Alger Fee's vigorous opposition to pretrials in criminal cases, 4 F.R.D. 338 (1946).
43. See Advisory Committee's Notes to proposed rule 17A and articles cited
therein.
44. See, e.g., Kaufman, Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 150,
151-54 (1959), discussing procedures used in United States v. Lev, 22 F.R.D. 490
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) and United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
45. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Appalachian Trial: Further Observations on
Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases, 44 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 53, 55 (1960). In the Appalachian case, the Government permitted defense pretrial examination of documents,
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Some federal prosecutors allow the defense extensive pretrial
inspection of government evidence. They report that such inspection not only has expedited trials, but in some cases has
convinced the defense of the strength of the prosecution's case
and thereby induced a plea of guilty.48 However welcome such
developments may be, the troubling fact remains that so long
as the availability of pretrial discovery to the defendant depends
upon the discretion of his adversary, the prosecutor, there is
always the risk of unequal treatment, the more to be questioned
because it is needless. Even the most fairminded prosecutor is
still an advocate and hence is not ideally situated to determine
when a legal process should be made available to a defendant
and when not. Such determinations are freighted with risk, even
when they rest on most plausible grounds. Thus, if a prosecutor
bars discovery except when his evidence is so strong that discovery might induce the defendant to plead guilty,47 he may
seriously discriminate against the defendant who is barred from
discovering the weakness of the evidence against him. Such a bar
operates with particular severity against the defendant least
able to afford astute counsel and hence most in need of discovery.
Again, if a prosecutor bars discovery except to a defense
attorney who answers to his concept of a trustworthy opponent,
or at least a good risk, he in effect imposes his own standards on
the criminal bar48 and discriminates against defendants represented by counsel whom he chooses to lock out from discovery.
Even a defense attorney who has received the boon of discovery
from the prosecutor may feel constrained not to use disclosures
with maximum effectiveness, however proper such use would be,
lest he be cut off from discovery in future cases.49 There is always
the risk that in the contentious atmosphere of a trial a prosecutor
may view a defense attorney's quite proper use of his disclosures
as an abuse of his generosity. Pretrial discovery can operate
effectively only if it is impartially administered in accord with
including confessions of the defendants and alleged co-conspirators, and of grand
jury minutes.
46. See Estes, Pre-Trial Conferences in Criminal Cases, 23 F.R.D. 560 (1959).
Cf. Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 56, 58 (1963). For a discussion of
the use of informal discovery procedures in the District of Columbia, see Junior
Bar Ass'n of D.C., Conference Papers on Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33
F.R.D. 101, 113-28 (1963).
47. See Comisky, Basic Criminal Procedure 37 (1958); Brennan, supra note
2, at 283; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif.
L. Rev. 56, 59 n.6 (1961).
48. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 283; Louisell, supra note 2, at 59.
49. See Pye, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 82, 85 (1963);
Remington, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 67, 71 (1963).
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objective standards free of adversary considerations of trial
strategy.
Federal practice permits additional discovery at the trial.
Thus, the need for prior inconsistent statements of a witness for
the purpose of impeachment qualifies as a "particularized need"
sufficient to justify their discovery. The Jencks Act provides for
discovery of prior statements of a witness50 except those made
before a grand jury. 5 ' Federal Rule 6(e) authorizes discretionary
discovery of grand-jury statements for purposes of impeachment.52 Such discovery, however, is subject to two procedural
limitations. First, statements can be given to the judge instead
of to the defendant, and the judge deletes whatever does not
relate to the testimony at trial." In grand-jury statements, he may
also delete whatever does not appear inconsistent with the trial
testimony. Although the entire statements are reviewable on
appeal, counsel cannot discover what has been deleted and
therefore cannot effectively argue its relevance and importance.
Such court inspection, however, affords a compromise of sorts
50.

18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958). The act reads, in part,
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made
by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than
the defendant) to an agent of the Government shall be the subject of
subpena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct
examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness
in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter
as to which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such
statement relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the
court shall order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use.

(e) The term 'statement,' as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d)...
means-(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him; or
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement made by said witness to an agent of the Government and
recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement.
51. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959).
52. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958)
(dictum).
53. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1958).
54.

See, e.g., Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1962),

cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963); United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338, 341
(2d Cir. 1958). In De Binder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961), the
court allowed direct examination of a witness's grand jury testimony without a
prior in camera inspection by a judge, but this procedure has not subsequently
been followed. See Note, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154, 1189 n.244 (1963). Compare
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 401 (1959).
55. United States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir. 1959); Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1958).
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between the defendant's right to use the statements and the Government's need to withhold information not relating to the witness' testimony. The second and more serious limitation in the
federal courts (except the Second Circuit) is the requirement of
a showing of probable inconsistency as a condition to the judge's
examination of grand-jury testimony." Lacking access to the
grand-jury minutes, defense counsel must depend on the chance
of a concession by the prosecution, or an admission by the witness, to make a showing of prior inconsistency.
Thus, discovery in federal practice is too often based on
chance or on arbitrary rules. There is little logic in thus limiting
discovery of statements of witnesses, testimony before the grand
jury, and other relevant material locked in the prosecutor's files,
to impeaching evidence and other evidence admissible at the trial.
Only if discovery is extended to all relevant unprivileged information not otherwise readily available can a defendant have reasonable assurance of ferreting out significant leads to admissible defense evidence. There would still be sufficient constraint on
discovery in the protection of privileged information and in
judicial discretion to bar discovery upon a showing that there is
danger of abuse.
The statutory law and the Federal Rules, inadequate not
only in themselves but in combination and diluted further by
paltry interpretation, have led only to the most rudimentary
form of criminal discovery. It ekes out an existence in a still unfavorable environment. Judges continue to bar discovery upon the
rationalization, at odds with the apparent intention of the draftsmen of the rules,57 that failure to authorize discovery is an implied
prohibition of it. Whatever the improvement offered by the
proposed amendments to the rules, the future of discovery in
56. The Second Circuit orders an in camera examination of the minutes to
discover possible inconsistencies without requiring any showing that inconsistencies
probably exist. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 88-89 (2d Cir.
1961); United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83, 85-86 (2d Cir. 1961). The District
of Columbia Circuit requires an in camera examination without any prior showing
when the Government's case depends upon the testimony of a single key witness.
Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
839 (1963). Other circuits generally require a prior showing of probable inconsistency. See, e.g., Berry v. United States, 295 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 955 (1962); Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53, 56 (10th Cir. 1961);
Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561, 566-67 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 844 (1956). See generally Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Minutes To Challenge Indictment and Impeach Witnesses in Federal Criminal Cases, 111 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1154, 1181-95 (1963). Of course, no showing of probable inconsistency is
necessary to require production under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1958).
Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487, 497 n.13 (1963).
57. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b); United States v. Taylor, 25 F.R.D. 225, 228
(E.D.N.Y. 1960); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure,
59 W. Va. L. Rev. 312, 334-37 (1957); Note, The Scope of Criminal Discovery
Against the Government, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 492, 498-99 (1954).
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federal prosecutions looks unpromising so long as the federal
courts fail to exercise their inherent power to foster a wholesome
integration of discovery procedures into the judicial process."
It is not without significance that since the Jencks case5 9 the
federal courts have been reluctant to exercise their inherent
powers to permit discovery. The Jencks case involved the prosecution of a labor union official for filing a false noncommunist
affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board. At the trial,
two key government witnesses admitted making prior statements
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the defendant's
communist activities. 0o The defendant, in vain, requested the
trial judge to examine the statements and deliver any parts
admissible to impeach the witnesses. The Supreme Court held
that such statements should be accessible to the defense without
a preliminary showing of probable inconsistency; e1 moreover, the
Court found it incumbent upon the trial judge to deliver whatever
related to the testimony at the trial without sifting the statements
for impeachment value.62 "Justice," said the Court, "requires no

less." 63
It was generally understood that this decision authorized
discovery even though no specific statute or rule was applicable.
Thereafter, one federal court of appeals applied the Jencks
ruling to grand-jury testimony,6 4 and some district courts allowed
pretrial discovery of witnesses' statements.0 5
In Congress, however, a different attitude prevailed. The
Jencks case had involved communist activities, and there was
fear in Congress that the Supreme Court's decision would compel
the Government to reveal confidential information about its anticommunist operations. 0 The fear found typical expression in one
congressman's lament that "the FBI files .

.

. were in effect

declared sitting ducks in an open hunting season by the Supreme
58. See the memorandum opinion of Justice Frankfurter, declining to join
the Court's adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 323 U.S. 821
(1944). Compare Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth ?, 1963 Wash. L.Q. 279, 293-94. See also Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641,
643-44, 652-65 (1960).
59. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
60. In view of a chronic tendency of one of the key witnesses' testimony to
become more damaging with each retelling, see United States v. Flynn, 130 F.
Supp. 412, 417-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), obtaining copies of his pretrial statement
would be a matter of considerable importance to the defense.
61. 353 U.S. at 666-68.
62. Id. at 668-69.
63. Id. at 669.
64. United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957) (per curiam).
65. See cases discussed in Note, The Aftermath of the Jencks Case, 11 Stan.
L. Rev. 297, 316-17 (1959); Comment, The Jencks Legislation: Problems in
Prospect, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 683 n.34 (1958).
66. See generally Murphy, Congress and the Court 127-53 (1962).
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Out of the congressional

hubbub, the Jencks Act emerged. It confirmed the Jencks holding
on the production of witnesses' statements at trial, but prohibited
their discovery prior to trial and avoided mention of other controversial matters, such as discovery of grand jury testimony and
prior statements of the defendant." There was no mistaking the
clear legislative purpose of Yes, No, and Maybe.
In the courts, Yes struck a responsive lost-and-found chord;
No struck a responsive dominant chord; and Maybe struck out.
Virtually no federal courts have since invoked their inherent
power to permit pretrial discovery. 9 In Palermo v. United
States,7 0 the Supreme Court held that the Jencks Act provides
the exclusive means for discovery of statements by government
witnesses and that since summaries or memoranda not representing the witness's own words are not statements within the act,
they are not discoverable at all. 7 '
All told, pretrial discovery lost ground. Lower federal courts
circumscribed it with the No of the Jencks Act and undertook to
circumscribe it further by taking a negative view of Maybe. The
trend of recent cases is against discovery of defendant's confessions 72 and of documents voluntarily surrendered by third
parties. 78 The denial of discovery of a confession constitutes a
saliently negative use of judicial discretion. Even though the
Supreme Court has consistently declared that discovery is "the
better practice," 74 a majority of federal courts have discouraged
that practice.
67. Comment, 67 Yale L.J. 674, 681 (1958), quoting Representative Collier of
Ilnois.
68. See note 50 supra.
69. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 25 F.R.D. 225, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). Only
the most inordinately aggravated circumstances would now seem to call for the
exercise of this power. See the discussion of United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962), in 47 Minn. L. Rev. 693, 698-99
(1963) .
70. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
71. One of the key issues under the Jencks Act is what constitutes a discoverable statement. The restrictive interpretation stated in the Palermo case was
recently relaxed in Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 (1963). There, an
FBI agent took notes while interviewing a witness and then, by referring to the
notes, reiterated the witness's story for his approval; several hours later, the agent
dictated an interview report based on both the notes and his memory. The Supreme Court upheld a trial judge's finding that this report was a copy of a statement made and adopted by the witness and, therefore, was within subsection (e)
(1) of the Jencks Act. See generally Note, The Jencks Act: After Six Years, 38
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1133, 1142-46 (1963).
72. Advisory Committee's Notes to proposed amendment to Rule 16. See note
34 supra.
73. See note 35 supra.
74. See Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958); Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 801 (1952).

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

242

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: 228

Thus, discovery has lost more ground than was necessary
under the Jencks Act, which actually ratified the Jencks decision
in principle and in much detail of procedure. Far from nullifying
the inherent power of the federal courts to provide for discovery,
Congress left them ample room to exercise that power freely. Even
if we allow for the dampening effect of the restrictive interpretation put on the Jencks Act in the Palermo case,75 there is nothing
in the act to impel the federal courts to discourage discovery of
grand-jury transcripts or to bar discovery of confessions or the
results of scientific tests. There could have been at least a standstill, if not a drift toward a modern system of criminal discovery.
There was no need to translate so much of Maybe into No. As
Justice Brennan observed in his concurring opinion in the Palermo
case, the commands of the Constitution in this area are "close
to the surface."7 A defendant has hardly had a fair trial if he
has been denied the opportunity to discover evidence or information crucial to his defense.
The ground thus lost by the federal courts is in part counterbalanced by recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
implementing the constitutional right to a fair trial. Though it
is the right that has been in the foreground, its implementation
has involved an expansion of discovery, at least at the trial
itself,77 for defendants in both federal and state courts. Proceeding
from the proposition that it is a denial of due process for the
prosecution to use perjured testimony knowingly,78 to suppress
evidence favorable to the defense deliberately,79 or to allow unsolicited false testimony to go uncorrected, 0 the Supreme Court
has concluded that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."8 1
75. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
76. Id. at 362-63. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 294 n.46.
77. Since only the complete denial of discovery would appear to present
questions of constitutional stature, there probably is no constitutional right to pretrial discovery; discovery at trial coupled with a continuance if necessary would
probably be adequate to meet constitutional requirements.
78. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112 (1935).
79. Pyle v. Kansas, supra note 78; Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960).
See Powell v. Wiman, 287 F.2d 275, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel.
Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904
(1953).

80. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S.
28, 31-32 (1957).

81. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See generally Cahn, Law in
the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 7-12 (1963); Note, The Duty of
the Prosecutor To Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 858 (1960).
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The primary consideration is the duty of the prosecutor to
present the case against the defendant fairly. A prosecutor mindful of this responsibility may be disposed to reveal weaknesses
in his case and evidence of possible defenses of which he is aware.
The constitutional constraints conducive to disclosure should
serve to deflate the overvalued elements of secrecy and surprise.
It bears noting, however, that such constraints cannot alone assure the development of optimum discovery procedures.
I turn now to criminal discovery in my own state because
it affords so sharp a contrast to federal practice and perhaps also
some portent of comparable expansion in areas where restrictive
rules still prevail. In California, statutory law accords the
defendant a right before trial to a transcript of the grand-jury
testimony if he is prosecuted by indictment or to a transcript
of the testimony at his preliminary hearing if he is prosecuted by
information. 82 The statutes, however, do not require the prosecution to present its entire case in grand-jury proceedings or at the
preliminary hearing or to inform the defendant of evidence not
there presented that it intends to introduce at the trial. Developments in this regard have been left to judicial decision.
In 1956, the court in People v. Riser" established the right
of the defendant to obtain at trial a statement made by a prosecution witness to the police. That decision emerged from the
reasoning that
Fabsent some governmental requirement that information be kept
confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the
state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence
that can throw light on issues in the case nd in particular it has no
interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not
been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached
as the evidence permits. To deny flatly any right of production
on the ground that an imbalance would be created between the
advantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight of
the true purpose of a criminal trial, the ascertainment of facts.84
That reasoning applies with like force to pretrial discovery;
accordingly, a defendant now has a right to such discovery of
facts known to the prosecution.85
See also United States v. Consolidated Laundries
1961), 62 Colum. L. Rev. 526 (1962). Compare
U.S. 343, 362-65 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring)
times require production of witnesses' statements).
82. Cal. Pen. Code §1 938.1, 869. See Cal. Pen.
83. 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
84. Id. at 586, 305 P.2d at 13.
85. See cases collected in Jones v. Superior
P.2d 919, 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 880 (1962).

Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir.
Palermo v. United States, 360
(sixth amendment may someCode § 943.
Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 58, 372
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There remains to be articulated how much the right encompasses. The defendant must show better cause for discovery
"than a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has
been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.""
A showing, however, that the defendant cannot readily obtain the
information through his own efforts will ordinarily entitle him to
pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evidence, or information
that might lead to the discovery of evidence, if it appears reasonable that such knowledge will assist him in preparing his defense.
Moreover, in the absence of a countervailing showing by the
prosecution that the information may be used for an improper
purpose,87 discovery is available not merely in the discretion of
the trial court, but as a matter of right.
Thus, defendants are entitled to pretrial discovery of the
names and addresses of witnesses, 88 photographs," results of scientific and other investigations,9 0 and statements to the police by
defendants or witnesses, whether or not the statements are signed
or acknowledged." The defendant need not claim ignorance of
the facts; he need claim only ignorance of the contents of the
statements or the details of the materials he seeks to inspect. 92 He
need not show that the material sought will be admissible into
evidence; he need show only that it may aid him in the ascertainment of the facts.93 If necessary, he may also obtain an order that
86. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349 P.2d 964, 973, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148,
157 (1960).
87. People v. Lopez, 384 P.2d 16, 28-30, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 436-38 (1963)
(identity of prosecution witnesses withheld until twenty-four hours before they
were to testify on showing that they might be subject to tampering or elimination).
See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif. L. Rev.
56, 99-101 (1961), urging the propriety of limiting right to discovery to prevent
abuse when organized crime or criminal gangs are involved.
88. People v. Lopez, supra note 87; Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 133, 136, 343 P.2d 139, 141 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). See People v. Cooper,
53 Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349 P.2d 964, 973, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157 (1960).
89. Norton v. Superior Court, supra note 88, at 136, 343 P.2d at 141. See
People v. Cooper, supra note 88, at 770, 349 P.2d at 973, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 157
(1960).
90. Brenard v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318, 341 P.2d 743, 746
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 513, 520, 327
P.2d 68, 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d
134, 141, 317 P.2d 130, 135 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957). See People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d
755, 770, 349 P.2d 964, 973, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157 (1960).
91. People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 142, 367 P.2d 680, 684, 18 Cal. Rptr. 40,
44 (1961); People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 355 P.2d 641, 7 Cal. Rptr. 897
(1960); Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959); Funk v.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959); People v. Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d
590, 594, 335 P.2d 114, 117 (1959); Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 92, 330
P.2d 773 (1958); Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
92. Cash v. Superior Court, supra note 91; Vance v. Superior Court, supra

note 91; Powell v. Superior Court, supra note 91.
93. People v. Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 716, 355 P.2d 641, 642, 7 Cal. Rptr.
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the prosecution refrain from interfering with defense counsel's
right to seek interviews with witnesses. 94
It bears noting that discovery against the prosecution either
before or at the trial can be invoked only if the prosecution can
produce the material requested. Material in the possession of
United States officials in their official capacity, for example, cannot be obtained without their consent for use in a state prosecution. As in the case of other material beyond the process of the
court, the unavailability of material in the possession of United
States officials does not preclude a conviction unless state officials
played some part in putting it beyond reach. 95
The statutory provisions governing subpoenas have been interpreted as precluding the taking of depositions of witnesses for
the purposes of pretrial discovery.96 Such an interpretation can
be reconciled with the trend toward a broad right of discovery
by the defense. The prosecutor is directly involved in the conduct
of the action and is therefore subject at all times to the inherent
power of the court to regulate the proceedings before it. Independent witnesses, on the other hand, may be strangers to the
litigation except when testifying, and the courts are understandably slow to invoke their inherent power to expand compulsory
process against such witnesses. It is too early to say whether additional experience will disclose a need to provide for additional
pretrial discovery from independent witnesses. It may develop
that a defendant needs no more than the right to discover the
identity of such witnesses and any statements they have made to
the police and the right to obtain orders when necessary to prohibit the prosecutor from instructing witnesses not to talk to
defense counsel.
The development in California of pretrial discovery in criminal cases owes much to the availability of the writs of mandamus
and prohibition to review orders granting or denying discovery.9 7
897, 898 (1960); People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755, 770, 349 P.2d 964, 973, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 148, 157 (1960); Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959);
People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 338 P.2d 428, 430 (1959); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 141, 317 P.2d 130, 134 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
94. People v. Cooper, supra note 93, at 770-71, 349 P.2d at 973-74, 3 Cal.
Rptr. at 157-58; Yannacone v. Municipal Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191,
193 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Walker v. Superior Court, supra note 93, at 140, 317
P.2d at 134.
95. People v. Parham, 384 P.2d 1001, 1003, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 499 (1963).
96. Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961). See Yannacone v. Municipal Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
97. In the federal courts, orders granting or denying discovery can ordinarily
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If, for example, a defendant could not challenge an order denying
pretrial discovery except on appeal from a final judgment of conviction, the issue of whether discovery should have been granted
at the pretrial stage, turning on the time of discovery, might
easily be sidetracked. In the event the trial court had also denied
discovery at the trial, the main preoccupation would be with the
propriety of discovery rather than with the appropriate time for
it. If instead the trial court granted discovery at the trial, the defendant might find it difficult indeed to show that he was prejudiced by the denial of discovery at the pretrial stage. The main
preoccupation would then be with the question whether the defendant had been given adequate time to make appropriate use
of the information discovered. In effect the issue would become
one of the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion with
regard to a continuance. Appellate courts do not readily find an
abuse of discretion. Hence, the pretrial remedies, the writs to
review orders on discovery at the pretrial stage, have served as a
reminder that a sense of time in the law may be no less important
than a sense of place and that no two times are alike.98
The extension of pretrial discovery to defendants has activated speculation on the possibilities of extending the right of discovery to the prosecution. The California Supreme Court confronted the problem in Jones v. Superior Court." A defendant

charged with rape was granted a continuance of his trial so that
he could gather medical evidence that past injuries had made
him impotent and therefore physically incapable of committing
rape. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court directed the
defendant to give the prosecution the names of all physicians
subpoenaed by the defendant to testify about the alleged injuries
and those of all physicians who had examined or treated him with
be attacked only on appeal from the final judgment. See Byram Concretanks, Inc.
v. Meaney, 286 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1961); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Kirkpatrick, 203
F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1948);
Copp v. United States, 168 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1948). Compare Atlass v. Miner,
265 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1959), aff'd, 363 U.S. 641 (1960).
98. The possibilities that discovery offers to clarify issues and expedite trials
should not be vitiated, however, by meretricious and time-consuming challenges
of the right to discovery. Formal motions for discovery and appellate review of
discovery orders should be the exception rather than the rule, reserved for genuine
questions regarding the scope of an applicable privilege or directed against indiscriminate discovery.
The reasons that militate against wholesale writs of review also militate against
a right to discovery before the preliminary hearing except in the unusual situation
where it would enable the defendant to establish at the hearing that the prosecution's case is without foundation. We have accordingly discouraged such discovery
in the usual situation in California by denying petitions for writs to compel discovery before the preliminary hearing.
99. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
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respect to the alleged injuries, as well as all related medical reports and X-rays. The defendant sought a writ of prohibition to
prevent enforcement of the trial court's order on the grounds
that it violated his privilege against self-incrimination and that,
in any event, the court had no authority to make it. We reviewed
the cases that had granted pretrial discovery to defendants and
noted that, in the absence of any applicable privilege, neither
side had a valid interest in denying to the other access to evidence
that could throw light on the issues of the case. We held that
since there was no express legislation governing criminal pretrial discovery, it was as proper for the courts to develop rules
governing discovery in favor of the prosecution as it had been to
develop such rules in favor of the defendant.
Since the defendant could not be compelled to testify or
produce private documents in his possession, we recognized that
ordinarily the prosecution could not require him to reveal his
knowledge of the existence of possible witnesses and the existence
of reports and X-rays for the purpose of preparing its case against
him. Did it therefore follow that the defendant could not be
required to reveal in advance the witnesses he intended to call
at the trial and the evidence he intended to introduce? A number
of states by statute require a defendant specifically to plead certain defenses such as insanity or alibi and to reveal in advance of
trial the names of the witnesses who will be called in support of
such defenses. 00 These statutes have been sustained over the
objection that they violate constitutional privileges against selfincrimination, for they do not compel the defendant to reveal or
produce anything, but merely regulate the procedure by which he
presents his case.' 0 ' We found this reasoning persuasive. The
trial court's order that the defendant reveal the names of witnesses he intended to call and produce reports and X-rays he
intended to introduce in evidence simply required him to disclose
information that he would shortly reveal in any event. He was
thus required only to decide at a point earlier in time than he
would ordinarily have to whether to remain silent or to disclose
the information. He lost only the possible tactical advantage of
taking the prosecution by surprise at the trial, an advantage that
in any event would easily have gone for naught given the probability that the trial court would have granted the prosecution a
continuance to prepare a rebuttal. We therefore concluded that
in this regard the order did not violate the defendant's privilege
100. See Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 Calif.
L. Rev. 56, 61 n.13 (1961).

101. See Dean, Advance Specifications of Defense in Criminal Cases, 20
A.B.A.J. 435, 440 (1934).
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against self-incrimination or the due process requirements of a
fair trial and held that the prosecution could discover such information before trial. Since the trial court's order was not
limited to the discovery of such information, however, we prohibited its enforcement to the extent that it required the defendant to reveal information that he did not intend to reveal at
the trial.
There were two dissents. One took the view that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination entitled the defendant
to wait until the prosecution had presented its case at the trial
to decide what defenses he would invoke and what evidence he
would introduce. The other made no commitment on this constitutional question. Its view was that the majority opinion opened
the door to serious curtailments of the theretofore recognized
right of the defendant to conceal his strategy until the prosecution put on its case, and that such curtailments should be made,
if at all, only by the legislature.
The privilege against self-incrimination protects the defendant from assisting the prosecution in proving his guilt. Once
he makes a defense, however, through testimony or the disclosure
of material witnesses or through documents or other real evidence,
he opens the door to the discovery of evidence against him that
might otherwise remain undiscovered. It rests with him to determine the extent to which he wishes to waive his privilege. To do
so intelligently, he must be informed of the case against him before trial.
One must keep in mind that in the event of a surprise defense, the prosecution in all likelihood would be granted a reasonable continuance to meet it. Certainly, such a continuance
would not impair the privilege against self-incrimination or the
due process requirements of a fair trial. Likewise, nothing is lost
of the privilege, and much is gained in orderly procedure, if the
defendant is required to give advance notice of the evidence he
intends to offer in defense after he has himself received pretrial
discovery of the prosecution's case. He can hardly demand pretrial discovery and still insist on reserving his own surprises for
the trial. The good coin of discovery gains in value when it is
fairly exchanged at the appropriate procedural hours. Neither the
privilege against self-incrimination nor the due process requirements of a fair trial fix the time when the prosecution has presented its evidence at the trial as the only procedural hour at
which the defendant can be required to make his decision whether
to remain silent or to present his defense. Surely he can be required to make that decision before trial if he is given discovery
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of the prosecution's case before trial. A contrary decision in the
Jones case would not only have compelled resort to continuances
with their attendant delays, but would have foreclosed the development in criminal cases of pretrial conferences, which in civil
cases have served to limit and refine issues and to facilitate the
settlement of cases. 0 2
Valuable though discovery has proved in clarifying issues
and expediting their trial, it has yet to overcome the usual resistance of those who are set in old ways. Discovery is a bad word
to devotees of the old-time theater of hide-and-go-seek. It is time
to ask whether the element of surprise they set such store by is
not one of the most overrated elements in the judicial process. It
is one thing to acknowledge its usefulness in testing credibility,
but quite another to glorify it as the keystone of the adversary
system. If it were indeed the keystone, the arch would in truth
be fallen. The truth is most likely to emerge when each side seeks
to take the other by reason rather than by surprise. The more
open the process for eliciting it, the less need there is of surprise.
Despite abundant demonstration to the contrary, 0 3 there is
lingering objection to criminal discovery by the defendant on the
ground that it adds an undue advantage to those he already enjoys. There is no question that our legal system abundantly protects the accused; anyone who has lived under that system would
hardly have it otherwise. The only question is whether affording
discovery to the defendant amounts to overprotection. One can
determine that question only in relation to what he is protected
against. From the outset, he is under a cloud of suspicion despite
the presumption of his innocence. Though the prosecution carries
the burden of proof, it ordinarily has substantial resources for
marshaling evidence against him, particularly now with the advantage of scientific aids. He may be subjected to intensive questioning without an attorney present on his behalf. Even if bail is
available, he may have no money to avail himself of it.
Can it be said that under these circumstances he will be
overprotected, or even that he will put the prosecution at a disadvantage, if he is allowed discovery? At most, he will be better
able to prepare an answer to the charges against him than if he
attempted to do so in the dark. He will have timely knowledge
of evidence that might be impossible for him to investigate once
the trial is under way or that he could perhaps not afford to ipvestigate at any stage. He will have access to evidence that he
102. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
103. See Brennan, supra note 58, at 283-85; Goldstein, The State and the
Accused-Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960).
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might not be able to discover independently. He has a legitimate
interest in making his own evaluation of such evidence, and if his
interest is no greater than the prosecution's, it is certainly no less.
Whenever the circumstances of a particular case appear to
justify secrecy, the prosecution should of course be free to make
such a showing.? It is usually in a position to ascertain whether
the evidence it has against the defendant is limited to his case or
would continue to be pertinent in an investigation of well-organized
or even sporadic gang crime, and hence whether it should press
to bar the evidence from discovery. If the prosecution has assurance of secrecy upon a showing of circumstances to justify it,
there would be little objection to full pretrial disclosure to the
defense when there is no reasonable basis for secrecy.
Perhaps the experience in California and in other states 15
that are experimenting with criminal discovery will lead to its
widespread acceptance in the United States. The Jones case, indicating the two-sidedness of the discovery process, suggests that
we may be on the way to abandoning our preoccupation with surprise tactics just as we have substantially abandoned the technicalities of pleading that in their time were also overvalued. Able
lawyers have more than enough opportunity to display their
virtuosity in the clarification of real issues. It is no mean task to
isolate what the issues are, and in that task both sides would be
well served by discovery. There is more tensile strength in the
adversary system and a deal more nobility in the profession when
adversaries foster procedures that set them free from trick and
device and enable them to meet in grand encounter on the issues.
104. See People v. Lopez, 384 P.2d 16, 28-30, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424, 436-38
(1963).
105. See generally Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12
Stan. L. Rev. 293 (1960).

